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Project Apollo: The Genstar Report 
and the City of Calgary, 1973–1975
Max Foran
changed from one characterized by small builder-developers to 
large-scale enterprises with deep pockets. When city planners 
in the early 1970s began favouring corridor growth rather than 
expansion on wide fronts, these corporations began assembling 
land along these corridors just beyond the corporate limits.
In terms of land development, Calgary was somewhat of a 
maverick compared to other Canadian cities. Wanting to avoid 
further fringe communities like those that had arisen just outside 
the city limits during the 1909–14 land boom, civic administra-
tors adopted what they called “the unicity.” This concept called 
for large-scale annexations well in excess of that required for 
short-term growth. Endorsed by the McNally Royal Commission 
on the Metropolitan Growth of Edmonton and Calgary (1956), 
the unicity became an article of faith guiding annexation policy 
for the next fifty years. Civic administrators also hoped that 
ample land within the corporate boundaries would dissuade 
peripheral land development. However, since developers usually 
controlled land under options to purchase, they could afford to 
acquire peripheral land and play a waiting game. Project Apollo 
was one city administrator’s response to this perceived threat.
Like many Canadian cities, Calgary operated on a commission 
form of government. Appointed by City Council to whom they 
reported, Calgary’s four commissioners held wide executive 
powers in managing the city’s various departments. Following 
reorganization in 1968, the elected mayor ceased to chair the 
Board of Commissioners and became instead an ex officio 
member. This restructuring enhanced the power of the chief 
commissioner, whose mandate included the important law and 
the planning departments. Also important for the purposes 
of this discussion was the fact that, although expenditures by 
commissioners were generally subject to Council approval, the 
chief commissioner had access to a contingency fund that 
could be used at his discretion.
In early 1973, Chief Commissioner George Hamilton used his 
contingency fund to commission a secret study of the city’s 
leading construction and land development company. His aim 
was to assess the extent of the corporation’s land holdings and 
further to ascertain whether it had secured monopoly control of 
housing construction in the city. The study, code-named Apollo, 
was conducted by two local companies and took final form in a 
report presented to Hamilton in late 1973. Though any force the 
report might have had was eroded by petty politics, the Genstar 
This article focuses on a secret study commissioned by the City 
of Calgary chief commissioner in 1973 to ascertain the extent 
and threat of monopoly control by a leading land developer in 
the city. Kept from City Council for months after its completion, 
the report, code named Apollo, found that the Genstar group of 
companies was in a strong monopoly position. When released, 
the report led to a public debate, political infighting at City 
Hall, threats of legal action by Genstar, and a federal investiga-
tion. Though its findings on monopoly implications were never 
substantiated, the report did indicate the growing concentra-
tion of corporate power in the land development and construc-
tion industries in Calgary, and likely in other Canadian cities 
as well.
Cet article se concentre sur une étude secrète commandée par 
le commissaire en chef de la Ville de Calgary en 1973, qui avait 
pour but d’évaluer le risque d’un monopole par un de plus 
importants promoteurs immobiliers de la ville. Le rapport, 
nommé Apollo, fut tenu secret auprès du Conseil municipal et 
détermina que le groupe d’entreprises Genstar était un mono-
pole majeur. Quand le rapport fut finalement rendu disponible, 
il s’en suivit une période de débats publics, de désagréments 
au Conseil municipal, de menaces d’actions judiciaires par 
Genstar, et à une enquête judiciaire fédéral. Malgré que les al-
légations d’un monopole ne fussent jamais justifiées, le rapport 
démontra tout de même la concentration accrue du pouvoir des 
entreprises dans le domaine du marché foncier et immobilier 
dans la région de Calgary et possiblement dans les autres villes 
canadiennes.
Real estate activity has been a vital factor in determining 
Calgary physical growth patterns. The arbitrary role of the 
Canadian Pacific Railroad in fixing the precise location of the 
downtown area and in defining the city’s first socio-economic 
residential patterns cannot be understated. During the city’s 
settlement boom between 1909 and 1914, speculators made 
fortunes selling land with easy access to railway lines and roads 
that never materialized. Calgary’s first home-grown land de-
velopers influenced urban growth in the 1950s by building and 
servicing subdivisions on the city’s periphery in close proximity 
to utility trunk lines. By the 1970s the focus had changed yet 
again. Amid rising land prices and the promise of high profits 
in the housing industry, the land development business had 
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Report remained a controversial document. First it raised ques-
tions about monopolistic practices in land development and 
challenged the legitimacy of house prices in the city. Second, 
by casting Genstar and similar companies in an unfavourable 
light, the report damaged the reputation of the land develop-
ment industry in the city. Arguably, this public suspicion of the 
land developer would have surfaced, regardless. Nevertheless, 
it was the Genstar Report that gave first public knowledge of 
a disturbing trend in the city itself, and likely, by implication, in 
other major Canadian urban centres.
The role of the land developers in influencing urban growth 
in Canada has received little academic attention. Susan 
Goldenburg’s Men of Property: The Canadian Developers Who 
Are Buying America (1981) offers some excellent information on 
major developers including Carma and Genstar, and, being writ-
ten at the height of their prosperity, is also a testimonial to an 
emerging corporate force.1 Probably the best treatment of the 
land development industry in Canada is by Peter Spurr in Land 
and Urban Development: A Preliminary Study (1976).2 Using 
a wealth of tabular statistics and facts, Spurr discussed the 
concept of land as a commodity, and demonstrated that mo-
nopolies by major land development companies were present 
in Canadian cities by the mid 1970s. The only real attempts to 
discuss land developers and their relations with urban govern-
ments in any detail are by James Lorimer and other like-minded 
writers from City Magazine. Three books comprise the corpus 
of what amounted to a scathing critique of developer domi-
nance in the land assembly business and housing industry, a 
process enabled by collusive or hapless local governments.3 
Interestingly, in support of their arguments, Lorimer et al. singled 
out the Genstar Report for special discussion. However, as a 
result of their clear biases and lack of balanced analysis, these 
studies fall short on credibility grounds. As for the Genstar 
Report itself, it was withdrawn from public scrutiny in 1975 and 
for decades afterwards held a “Restricted” classification in the 
City of Calgary archives.4
Mirroring that of other Canadian cities, Calgary’s residential 
growth accelerated in the 1950s and continued largely un-
repressed into the new millennium. Characterized by single 
family dwellings, the pattern of suburbanization was enabled by 
substantial annexations between 1956 and 1964 that swelled 
the city’s area from 40 to 150 four square miles. New housing 
construction was controlled by local businessmen. Well into the 
1960s, house prices remained stable. In the light of the generally 
positive dialogue between the City and the Urban Development 
Institute (the development industry’s official spokesman), the 
period 1954–66 represented—certainly in the developers’ eyes—
the halcyon days of residential construction in Calgary.
Two factors conspired to bring an end to this quiescent period 
of locally controlled urban housing development in the city. The 
first concerned the dramatic rise in house prices that began 
around 1967 and by 1971 had become a major civic issue. A 
modest bungalow in an average suburb that cost $12,000 in 
1960 was worth over $20,000 a decade later. Monthly payments 
on new mortgages had doubled while the income necessary 
to secure one had risen almost 70 per cent. While increased 
construction and servicing costs were the main culprits pushing 
house prices up, it was the faster rising land values that cap-
tured media and public attention. They had increased by over 
100 per cent in the 1960s compared to about 70 per cent for 
construction costs.
The developers equated these rising land prices with lot short-
ages. They felt that civic policies were holding large tracts of 
developable land off the market, and claimed that studies on 
transportation issues, utilities feasibility, potential park space, or 
airport regulations had removed the potential for building thou-
sands of houses in the city. Their solution was simple. Arguing 
that housing prices were a reflection of the costs of land, which 
in turn were determined by its availability, the developers 
pressed for expansion of the city’s corporate boundaries.5 In 
1972 Commissioner Denis Cole noted that the City was being 
influenced to make large areas serviceable in the belief that the 
only way to keep the price of serviced lots down was to in-
crease the supply of land.6
By the middle of 1972 the City found itself in a difficult position. 
The developers’ argument about lot shortages was given more 
credence following the City’s decision to freeze the develop-
ment of 2,500 acres of land on Nose Hill pending further study. 
A similar situation was unfolding in the south, where develop-
ment of the Fish Creek valley was being forestalled by mounting 
opposition favouring a park over houses. The City’s response 
was predictable. In July 1972 an Interim Annexation Policy was 
implemented as a precursor to a long-range comprehensive 
policy. Though a new policy advocating the annexation of 125 
square miles was not announced until early 1974, there can be 
little doubt that its foundations dated to the Interim Annexation 
Policy of 1972. Given the unicity concept, Hamilton’s desire to 
know about land holdings on the city’s periphery along the ap-
proved growth corridors was understandable.
The second reason precipitating changing attitudes towards 
residential development in the city was related to the land 
development industry itself. Though several outside develop-
ers operated in the city, including the Winnipeg-based Quality 
Construction (Qualico), the bulk of the city’s houses were being 
built by two companies, both of which were extensions of the 
local construction industry. The Kelwood Corporation, formed in 
late 1953 by five members of the construction industry, concen-
trated in areas south of the Bow River. By 1957 the consortium 
was building around 40 per cent of new homes in the city. In re-
sponse to an increasing demand for houses in the north and in-
deed to Kelwood’s market domination, the second of Calgary’s 
homegrown developer companies was born in 1958.7 Carma 
Developers comprised forty-three members of the Calgary 
House Builders Association who contributed $250,000 to 
launch the company. Carma was a unique organization based 
on the co-operative principle with its sole aim to acquire tracts 
of land and then distribute the subdivided lots to its members 
on a proportionate shareholder basis. Another unique feature 
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was the fact that other prominent builder-developers in the city 
were shareholders in Carma, including Quality Construction, 
and the major shareholder, Nu-West Homes. By 1971 Carma 
was recording pre-tax profits of $1.6 million on gross sales of 
$8.2 million, and in the following year when it went public the 
company upped its sales to $17.0 million and profits to $4.8 
million. After it became a public company in 1969, Nu-West 
Development Corporation Limited recorded an average annual 
growth rate of 27 per cent and in 1973 reported sales of $67.8 
million. Both Carma and Nu-West concentrated primarily on 
development in the north part of the city. Geographically sepa-
rated, supported by the construction industry, and in control of 
relatively cheap land either through sale by the City or on solid 
options to purchase, Kelwood and Carma led the land develop-
ment industry in creating suburban Calgary in the late 1950s 
and well into the 1960s.
This situation began to change in the mid-1960s with the ar-
rival in the city of a prominent Winnipeg-based competitor to 
Kelwood and Carma. Incorporated in 1961, British American 
Construction Materials Limited was a merger of several com-
panies involved in the heavy construction, building materials, 
housing, and land development industries.8 When it arrived 
in Calgary in 1965 the company was already a national player 
in the construction industry. Once in Calgary, it continued its 
diversified operations, which included the production of cement, 
concrete, asphalt, gypsum wallboard, cabinets and windows, 
and pre-assembled housing units. In 1966, the company 
purchased Engineered Homes, an important residential home-
builder and land developer, and a year later shortened its name 
to BACM Industries Limited. Within two years of its arrival in the 
city, the company increased its overall sales from $32.8 million 
to $53.7 million. These numbers, as well as the double-digit 
profit margins, were enough to attract an even bigger player 
to the city in the form of Genstar, a member of the powerful 
Belgian international mining conglomerate Société Général de 
Belgique.
Incorporated in Canada in 1951 as Sogemines Ltd. (the name 
Genstar was adopted in 1959), the company was originally 
interested in mining operations. However, it quickly became in-
volved in other activities, forming Inland Cement (1954), Iroquois 
Glass (1958), and Brockville Chemicals (1959). In 1965 Genstar 
amalgamated its three subsidiaries and became in effect a large 
industrial corporation with assets of approximately $100 million. 
Noting the opportunities afforded by a relatively fragmented 
house building and land development industry, Genstar decided 
to move west and shift its operational focus. The natural choice 
was Calgary, a city increasingly recognized as the national 
administrative centre of the oil and gas industry, and more sig-
nificantly boasting a 5–10 per cent annual population increase. 
In 1968 Genstar acquired a controlling interest in BACM and 
assumed full ownership in 1970 at a total cost of $40 million. 
Through BACM, Genstar embarked on a $30 million buying 
spree. By 1971, Genstar controlled Consolidated Concrete Ltd., 
a major player in the ready-mix concrete business; Conforce 
Products Ltd., a manufacturer of pre-cast and pre-stressed 
structural concrete products; Borger Construction Co. Ltd., a 
major force in the installation and servicing of utilities; and the 
Kelwood Corporation, one of the two leading land development 
companies in the city. In 1972, when sales topped $360 million, 
Genstar was ranked in the top echelon of Canadian companies.
The increasingly powerful presence of Genstar must have been 
disquieting to Calgary’s chief civic administrator, especially 
after City Council began considering further annexation in mid-
1972. In this context Hamilton’s reasons for ordering an inquiry 
into the activities of a potential monopoly presence within the 
construction and land development industries is not surprising. 
Indeed, he may even have anticipated the comprehensive an-
nexation proposal, and the decision to put it to the ratepayers in 
a plebiscite at the end of 1974. His intention to submit the report, 
if warranted, to the federal authorities for investigation under 
the Federal Combines Act is also understandable. Hamilton’s 
bypassing of City Council is baffling. Possibly he believed that 
certain aldermen were more sympathetic towards developers 
than their political office allowed. Certainly Mayor Rod Sykes 
shared that opinion. Hamilton might also have anticipated 
Council’s reluctance to spend taxpayers’ money in what might 
have been construed as a witch hunt. Or, as argued later, he 
may have simply ignored Council’s right to know. Whatever the 
reason, Hamilton opted to operate alone. By the end of 1972, he 
was ready to put his highly irregular plan into action.
In January 1973, Hamilton commissioned a private study by two 
reputable Calgary firms. Burnet, Duckworth, Palmer, Tomblin, & 
O’Donohue were lawyers; Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath, and 
Horwath were accountants and management consultants. Their 
task was to investigate the activities of Genstar in Calgary and 
peripheral areas in order to determine if “the scope of such 
operations is such that Genstar Limited has attained or could 
attain a position where its activities could be deemed capable of 
unduly preventing or lessening competition or adversely affect-
ing prices in one or more of the said industries to the detriment 
of the residents of the City of Calgary.”9 Code-named Apollo, 
the secret investigation was to be conducted by as few peo-
ple as possible, with progress reports going to Hamilton only. 
Noting the unorthodox nature of the assignment and its legal 
Source: City of Calgary Municipal Manuals
Table 1: Number and value of building permits 1945–1978 (selected years)
Year Number Value ($000s)
1945 2,448 7.280
1950 4,136 25.864
1953 4,972 42.121
1958 7,278 101.564
1965 5,972 129.126
1972 10,224 223.624
1978 16,693 1,059.353
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implications, both companies were wary. Stressing that “we will 
not be in a position to guarantee our findings,”10 they accepted 
the commission on the condition that the final report remain 
confidential and under no circumstances would be released to 
the public. When they began their investigation, both companies 
were under the assumption that the above requests would be 
honoured.
Hamilton kept his own counsel on the matter until June 1973, 
when he confided in fellow commissioner, Denis Cole. A month 
later, the investigators informed Hamilton that the cost of the 
report would be significantly higher than his contingency fund.11 
Worried that payment might be an issue, the investigators sug-
gested that the mayor be advised. Hamilton refused.12 Though 
now clearly concerned about the clandestine nature of Apollo 
and its possible implications, the investigators went ahead and 
completed their investigation in the fall of 1973. A draft of the re-
port was delivered to Hamilton on 11 December with a caution-
ary accompanying letter that noted,
The conclusions and findings contained herein have been arrived 
at on the basis of all public facts known and obtainable by the 
writers and from ancillary information obtained or obtainable as 
deemed necessary on a judgmental basis by our firms. Since 
the investigation required to a large extent the exercise of judg-
mental factors we are not in a position to guarantee our findings 
although these finding were conscientiously prepared on the 
basis of all information obtained or obtainable by us.13
Clearly nervous about possible ramifications, the writers went 
on to stress that it “has been prepared solely for your informa-
tion and guidance and may not be used or quoted in whole or 
in part in connection with any public communication or release 
without our written consent.” In early January 1974, Hamilton 
gave copies to the other appointed commissioners and the City 
solicitor. At this point, neither the mayor nor City Council had 
been advised of either the investigation or the report.
Details in the often rambling and repetitive report were as 
potentially explosive as the investigators feared. It opened with 
four main conclusions.14 According to the report, an oligopolistic 
situation existed in the Calgary construction industry, one domi-
nated significantly by Genstar to the degree that its activities 
could be deemed capable of “unduly preventing or lessening 
competition or adversely affecting prices.” Second, the report 
included the land development industry by concluding that 
Genstar operations “could, if they have not already, attain a 
position where its activities could be deemed capable of unduly 
preventing or lessening competition or adversely affecting 
prices . . . to the detriment of the citizens of Calgary.” Focusing 
on land assembly on the city’s periphery, the report surmised 
that BACM had acquired extensive tracts of undeveloped prime 
land in the city’s south-east corridor. The report made similar 
observations about land assembly by Carma in the northwest 
and northeast and Nu-West in the northwest.
Third, the report believed that a prima facie case was suf-
ficiently strong to justify submission to the appropriate federal 
authorities. The final conclusion weighed heavily on Hamilton. 
Whether it was just a manifestation of the authors’ nervousness 
or indicative of some very broad conclusive leaps, the report 
recommended that the burden of proof wait on subsequent 
investigations in the form of “an extensive analysis of each of 
the industries and markets.”15 Despite its authors’ cautionary 
tone, the report was a forthright document. The details were 
disturbing. With respect to the construction industry, the report 
focused primarily on Genstar subsidiary BACM Industries, 
though Nu-West and Qualico Developments were also cited. In 
documenting its “dominant role in heavy construction, building 
materials, land development and housing activities,” the report 
discussed BACM’s extensive horizontal and vertical involvement 
in virtually every component of the house building industry from 
land development and utilities servicing to quarries and con-
crete manufacturing plants, and from house sales to gypsum 
wallboard and kitchen cupboards.16 The report also alluded to 
Genstar’s invisible presence. According to the report, Genstar 
fostered the practice of retaining, advertising, and develop-
ing trade names of locally acquired businesses with little overt 
attempt to relate these names to their parent company. In 
referring to the ostensible competition between Keith Homes 
and Engineered Homes, the report noted that there was “no 
apparent disclosure to the public that they were both divi-
sions of the same company.”17 In the housing market, cabinets 
were manufactured by Sungold Manufacturing, windows by 
Sunrise Distributors, and gypsum wallboard by Truroc Gypsum 
Products. Plumbing and heating services were supplied by 
Parkdale Plumbing and Parkdale Heating, and electrical work by 
Midwest Electric. Though all were owned by Genstar through 
BACM, the report indicated that the public probably construed 
them as independent operators.18
In terms of land development, the report singled out BACM, 
Carma Developers Ltd., Nu-West Development Corporation 
Ltd., and Quality Construction Ltd as comprising the elements 
of monopoly control. Noting dovetailing of interests (BACM, 
Nu-West, and Quality were all shareholders in Carma) the report 
argued that by concentrating in the growth corridors on the city 
periphery, “these developers are anticipating the extension of 
the City boundaries in the growth corridors chosen by them. 
Should their anticipation prove correct, the companies face the 
prospect of windfall profits and control of developable lands 
and serviced lot supply.”19 In the report’s view, smaller opera-
tors, unable to compete with Genstar’s “vast resources, were 
predictable casualties.”20 According to Donald Gutstein in an 
article in The Second City Book, Genstar’s financial muscle was 
further augmented through its very close ties with the Royal 
Bank.21 The report also saw a threat in Genstar’s foreign owner-
ship and devoted significant attention to its international range 
of activities.
With the report’s strong indictment now in their hands, the com-
missioners faced the decision of how to act upon it. In a confi-
dential letter to Mayor Rod Sykes on 28 February 1974, Denis 
Cole, the newly appointed chief commissioner, summarized his 
view of the situation. Certain elements of the report gave “cause 
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for grave concern.” While he felt that the problem was incipi-
ent, Cole added that Genstar’s capacity to unduly influence the 
supply and price of serviced land was growing, and that what 
“was a possibility is now a serious threat,” one that would unfold 
on Genstar’s terms. Though Cole advocated the need to break 
Genstar’s control, he did not see the City as an active agent. He 
rejected the possibility of withholding services from the cor-
poration’s land holdings, and the idea of civic land banking as 
too expensive and ultimately futile. His solution was to involve 
the federal and provincial governments—the former through a 
submission under the Federal Combines Act, the latter through 
several initiatives including land banking and direct involvement 
in the construction industry. Cole concluded, “It is the unani-
mous view of the authors of this report, the Commissioners and 
our City Solicitor that it would not be in the public interest to 
reveal the contents of this report to Council or the public until 
we together have had an opportunity to thoroughly review its 
implications and the steps to be taken to safeguard the interests 
of citizens of Calgary.”22
Sykes, though very upset over Hamilton’s actions, agreed with 
Cole.23 Council was not notified. On 30 April 1974, the Board of 
Commissioners discussed the matter at length. It was agreed 
that the best course of action was to give the report to the 
appropriate federal authorities but not before a second opin-
ion was received, and after BACM had seen it. In the interim, 
the report was to remain confidential. A land policy review 
was also urged.24 The report was then sent to A.W. Howard 
of Howard, Dixon, Mackie, and Forsythe for a legal opinion. It 
was also decided not to allow BACM to see the report until 
after Howard’s response. Howard offered his first opinion on 
24 July. Though he could not comment on the factual data, 
Howard supported the report’s opinions and conclusions but 
recommended against giving it to BACM, since the “public-
ity that might result therefrom may in fact bring the matter to 
public attention . . . and hamper the investigative efforts of the 
Combines Investigation Branch.” When Howard wrote to Cole 
again on 9 September, he recommended sending the report 
to the Combines and Investigation director on a confidential 
basis, with a covering letter stating that there had been no 
communication with Genstar. In advocating utmost secrecy, 
Howard stressed that “the report itself should be and remain 
exactly what it is—a confidential report.”25 Eleven days later, 
citing concerns in “current trends in the land development, con-
struction and housing industries which could, if they have not 
already, lessen the competition or adversely affect prices,” the 
mayor and commissioners decided on a delegation to Ottawa 
to present this “confidential information” to the Department of 
Consumer Affairs.26
On 26 September, four days before Chief Commissioner Denis 
Cole and City Solicitor Brian Scott discussed the Genstar 
Report with Robert Bertrand, the director of Investigations 
and Research, Mayor Rod Sykes wrote a puzzling letter to 
Bertrand.27 While not mentioning the report, Sykes referred to 
increasing monopoly control of land and construction materi-
als and stated his belief “that too few firms now control too 
much land and their price setting mechanism is such as to raise 
residential land prices unduly.” Sykes then went on to support 
Cole and Scott and requested an inquiry pursuant to a formal 
investigation. However, he also qualified his remarks by warning 
that any inquiry “will undoubtedly show that the Council of the 
City of Calgary may itself have contributed to this concentration 
Table 2: Area of Calgary 1945–1978
Source: City of Calgary Municipal Manuals
Year Square miles
1945 39.637
1954 40.137
1957 74.000
1962 151.500
1964 155.800
1974 157.000
1976 162.000
1978 189.000
Table 3: Calgary Population 1950–1975
Source: City of Calgary Municipal Manuals
Year Population
1950 114,000
1951 129,060
1954 156,745
1956 179,711
1958 206,831
1959 218,418
1960 235,428
1961 241,675
1962 269,068
1963 276,975
1964 294,924
1965 311,116
1966 323,289
1967 335,806
1968 354,856
1969 369,025
1970 385,436
1971 398,034
1972 412,777
1973 424,787
1974 433,389
1975 453,812
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Figure 1: Comprehensive annexation 1974 (125 square miles).
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of land holdings by selling areas that were municipally owned 
to the land owners about whom we are concerned and by 
proceeding with annexation to assist them to bring their lands 
within the development market.” After acknowledging his own 
efforts to thwart these measures, Sykes added, “It seems rather 
unusual for me to draw this matter to your attention when in fact 
City Council may be one of the offenders in that it contributes to 
the problem it complains about.”
The reasons behind these qualifications are conjectural. The 
most logical suggests that Sykes was genuinely concerned 
about removing himself from an inquiry that he felt might indict 
City Hall. However, it is also distinctly possible that it was a 
guarded reference to the validity of the Genstar Report as 
attested by his later remarks on its political nature.28 The reply 
received by Sykes on 4 October from Bertrand was not help-
ful. Bertrand did not refer to Sykes’s fears. He did, however, 
acknowledge receiving the report and its usefulness in help-
ing him determine whether a violation had occurred under the 
Combines Investigation Act. Bertrand then closed the matter 
by saying that any subsequent investigation would be privately 
conducted and in effect the City would be hearing no more 
about it.29
The mayor and commissioners, however, had prevaricated too 
long. By the fall of 1974, news of a secret report had filtered 
down to City Council. It is not known whether Alderman 
Barbara Scott was the first to secure information about the 
report, but she was certainly the one who brought it to the 
fore. On 23 September, during the regular City Council meeting, 
Scott requested a list of reports prepared by commissioners 
that had been kept from aldermen. Scott noted that she had 
reason to believe that such reports existed and likely thought 
that they had to do with the big annexation issue. Cole was eva-
sive in his answer. Without mentioning any secret report, he told 
Scott that she would receive a copy but it would be up to her 
whether or not to release it to the public.30 Doubtless with this 
latter comment, members of the press in attendance pricked up 
their ears.
With the press baying about secrecy, intrigue, and the upcom-
ing annexation plebiscite, Project Apollo had become a politi-
cal football. Cole tried to defuse the situation. In a letter on 30 
September to the mayor and Council, with copies to the press, 
Cole stated that the Board of Commissioners had for some 
time been concerned about trends in the land development 
and housing industries, and that this concern had already been 
made public through a report to Council in July 1973.31 In this 
report, fears had been expressed about the level of competition 
in the land development industry and the potential balkaniza-
tion of the city into “spheres of influence.” Quoting from this 
report, Cole pointed out that it did not in any way “imply that any 
developer, housebuilder or a combination of them are not acting 
in the public interest.” Cole also noted that through subsequent 
regular consultations with developers, the City now had a good 
grasp of the land development supply.
Cole then mentioned the Genstar Report. He acknowledged its 
confidential nature but argued that while it confirmed the need 
for vigilance, it was also inconclusive. He also felt that the aim 
of the report had been achieved through its submission to the 
federal authorities. Cole also argued strongly for keeping the re-
port from the public, citing a possible lawsuit, the wishes of the 
authors, and interestingly, a desire to avoid “possible damage to 
a good corporate citizen.”
It was not enough. Council demanded to see the report in a 
special meeting on the morning of 3 October. In a closed ses-
sion later in the day, and following a heated three-hour debate, 
it voted nine to four to release the report to the public. Council’s 
decision was made in the face of strong contrary advice by 
commissioners, the City solicitor, and Mayor Sykes—all of 
whom had raised the potential for legal action.32 According to 
Sykes, the City would “be blown out of the water by a massive 
lawsuit.”33 Alderman Eric Musgreave assessed the majority 
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Figure 2: Calgary developer holdings outside city limits, 1973.
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mood on Council when he said, “The important thing is that we 
have one politician, four commissioners and a few lawyers who 
are telling us that they are the important people and that they 
know better than we do how the people are to be governed.”34
The reaction was swift and predictable. In a special release 
on 7 October, Nu-West distanced itself from the accused by 
stating that “it had no connection whatsoever with the Genstar 
group of companies.”35 Carma seemed unperturbed saying 
that “it had nothing to hide.” BACM noted its amazement that 
the City “could pay so much for information already available 
in the public domain.”36 BACM and Carma disclosed details to 
the press about their land holdings both within the city and in 
the proposed annexations area.37 BACM claimed ownership 
of 1,640 acres within the city and 3.5 square miles in the an-
nexation area, of which 2.5 square miles was under an option 
to purchase. Carma controlled 7,000 acres mostly outside the 
city, of which 1,200 were in the proposed northwest annexation 
area.38 Matters became more serious when Calgary MP Eldon 
Woolliams brought the subject up in the House of Commons, 
alluding to Genstar’s national activities. This was too much. 
Monopoly in Calgary and area was one thing; national implica-
tions were another. On 9 October, BACM Vice-President Tom 
Denton announced that the company’s reputation was “irrepa-
rably harmed” by the report’s “inaccuracies, distortions and 
unsubstantiated allegations,” and that Genstar was made to 
appear “mysterious and conspiratorial and that nothing could 
be further from the truth.”39 By the middle of October and the 
day after the defeat of the annexation plebiscite, the City was in 
damage-control mode. On 17 October, Denis Cole contacted 
Ralph Scurfield of Nu-West, informing him that the City was well 
served by the land developers but that the need to protect the 
public warranted “close watchfulness.”40
But not only had the report put the City in a potentially con-
frontational position with Genstar and the other developers, it 
had also ignited a political firestorm within City Hall. Two issues 
emerged. One involved the relationship between City Council 
and its administration. The second concerned the impending 
mayoralty election. The press seized upon both to the extent 
that the issue of the report itself and what it implied were se-
verely diminished.
There can be no doubt that City Council’s decision to release 
the report was an angry reaction to the way its authority had 
been undermined by administration and in particular, the Board 
of Commissioners.41 The Albertan concurred and, in noting 
“an affront to democracy,” called for a review of the discretion-
ary powers enjoyed by the commissioners.42 One press report 
indicated that aldermen were so upset by the commissioners’ 
actions that any further resistance on their part would result in 
instant dismissal.43
Alderman Eric Musgreave summed up the situation succinctly: 
“We have three isolated power bases at City hall—the aldermen, 
the Mayor and the City commissioners. There is no level of trust 
between the three . . .The experts believe that they know better 
than the aldermen from the street. How can council govern in 
that situation?”44 This view was supported by a University of 
Calgary political scientist who argued that the civic government 
in Calgary was polarized by different visions. According to Gene 
Dais, City Councils acted like amateur ombudsmen concerned 
primarily with the interests of their wards. On the other hand, 
Mayor Rod Sykes was a populist reformer who believed in open 
debate to resolve city-wide issues. In part, these conflicting 
perceptions about elected government’s proper role helped ex-
plain the latitude given to the appointed commissioners. In that 
context, Hamilton’s unauthorized action, the administration’s se-
crecy and withholding tactics, and a unilateral decision to take 
a civic matter to the federal authorities constituted predictable 
behaviour. Equally understandable was the rash decision made 
by an enraged City Council.
The second issue related to the upcoming mayoralty election 
in which the popular Rod Sykes was seeking his third term in 
office. Two of his opponents seized upon the Genstar Report as 
a way of unseating him. Arguing that Sykes was using the report 
to paint himself as a champion of justice, Ed Dooley claimed that 
Sykes had known about the inquiry all along and might have 
actually initiated it. According to Dooley, Sykes had early access 
to the report, since one of its authors was a former member of 
Sykes’s mayoralty campaign team.45 The accusation was denied 
by Sykes, who labelled Dooley’s accusations as “garbage.”46
If the press can be believed, another mayoralty candidate took 
a different tack. According to a press report, Alderman Peter 
Petrasuk said that it was he who had actually suggested the 
report to Commissioner Hamilton as a need to combat undue 
developer influence, and furthermore had given Hamilton advice 
while the report was under preparation.47 Though Petrasuk de-
nied making the statement, Sykes disagreed and censured him 
for withholding important information from the mayor and other 
aldermen. Sykes added that Petrasuk’s secrecy was linked with 
a desire to capitalize on the report as an election issue.48
The efforts of Dooley and Petrasuk were in vain. Sykes was re-
elected, albeit with a reduced majority. More significant, the big 
annexation proposal was easily defeated. The political shenani-
gans over the Genstar Report, while not pivotal to the result 
of the plebiscite, could hardly have had a positive influence 
in the minds of the voting public. The way parochial interests 
triumphed over good judgment was evidenced in the way city 
politicians dealt with the Genstar Report in the fall of 1974.
On 3 February 1975, Genstar went on the attack by giving for-
mal notice of a lawsuit against the City.49 According to Genstar 
counsel, James Unsworth, the highly discriminatory and errone-
ous nature of the report had “harmed the reputation of Genstar 
and its subsidiaries to the point that their business activities 
in Calgary and elsewhere have been, and will continue to be, 
adversely affected.” However, after giving notice of Genstar’s 
intention “to commence legal action for the purpose of clearing 
our reputation, discrediting the report and claiming damages,” 
Unsworth outlined what was probably the corporation’s real 
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the civic executive branch. The fact that the report was gener-
ated in the first place without City Council’s knowledge, and 
then subsequently kept from it for almost a year, was a blatant 
breach of authority.53 Indeed, aldermanic reaction to the report 
indicated frustration and anger over the undermining of City 
Council’s power. According to a contemporary source, the 
City’s commissioners ran the city as if it were a closed corpo-
ration.54 Alderman Pat Donnelly noted the same sort of thing 
in 1975. In that context, the Genstar Report reinforces Jack 
Masson’s conclusions that local government administrators in 
Alberta wielded far too much power.55
The fact that the Genstar Report was allowed to become “a 
political football” raises questions about City Council. It induced 
bitter political infighting at City Hall and was used to undermine 
the credibility of an outspoken mayor. Rod Sykes was not liked 
by several aldermen and senior administrators.56 His long-held 
conviction that City Hall was infused with apathy, ineptitude, 
and self-interest had led to antagonisms and resentment among 
Council and Administration. Rather than deciding on the best 
way to deal with the report, two mayoralty candidates turned 
it into an electioneering weapon and in so doing diminished its 
viability. Moreover, regardless of its accuracy, the confidential 
report could have been used to initiate some frank dialogue 
between the City and the developers. It might also have been 
received more favourably by federal authorities with respect to 
monopoly presence in the construction industry. As it was, the 
report’s credibility and therefore its potential for positive results 
were lost amid civic internecine strife.
The Genstar Report also offered some early insights into the 
emerging problem of urban sprawl. Enabled by transporta-
tion infrastructure to accommodate the automobile, generous 
mortgage financing, unrestrained utilities placements, govern-
ment policies, and marketing strategies by developers, outward 
urban growth had begun to affect planning decisions in North 
American cities by the early 1970s.57 In this period, Calgary 
planners equated sprawl solely with non-contiguous develop-
ment.58 To them, the decision to channel growth into corridors 
represented sound planning policy. Apparently distance from 
the downtown did not matter. The Genstar Report showed how 
quickly the major land developers dovetailed their interests with 
city planning strategies, and furnished a practical example of 
why they were so supportive of ongoing annexations.
The impact of the Genstar Report elsewhere is difficult to evalu-
ate. Certainly it alerted other cities to a disturbing trend. But 
whether they acted upon it warrants further study. Peter Spurr 
made reference to it in his discussions on monopoly pres-
ence. Likely it had the most effect on the Alberta government. 
Already worried about unrestrained expansion and its impact on 
surrounding rural areas, the provincial government was hostile 
to the big annexation proposal. Because the Genstar Report 
verified what was already suspected, it may have had some 
influence on the provincial government’s subsequent decision in 
1976 to establish a Restricted Development belt five miles wide 
around the city.59
intent. Genstar would be prepared to drop the lawsuit, pend-
ing within two weeks an official public statement from the City 
confirming the report’s inaccuracies and withdrawing it from the 
public. Unsworth also asked for a public apology for any harm 
caused to Genstar. An eight-page attachment outlining inac-
curacies and misinformation in the report gave notice of what 
the City might expect in a courtroom battle. According to this 
document, Genstar’s share of housing starts for the first half of 
1974 was only 19 per cent, and its holdings of undeveloped lots, 
less than 28 per cent. The corporation did not share informa-
tion and was not collusive with other companies. Monopoly, or 
intent to monopolize to the detriment of the market, had not 
been proven and could not be linked solely to size and range of 
operations. The attachment concluded by noting that there was 
“nothing in the report to support a conclusion that a monopoly 
exists or that any unlawful arrangements have been entered into 
by competitors in the industries served by Genstar.”
Though it allowed the two weeks to pass without comment, 
the City felt it had little option. Faced with the prospects of a 
seven-figure lawsuit that it very well might lose, the City took 
the safe route. Also, since Genstar’s lawsuit also included the 
two investigating companies, both of which had stipulated the 
confidentiality of the report as a prerequisite to its preparation, 
further legal action against the City was a possibility. Following 
several meetings, the matter was finally resolved on 23 June 
1975. In a joint press release, the City admitted that “the report 
contained inaccuracies and could contain innuendos that could 
reflect unfairly on Genstar and its subsidiaries for which the City 
sincerely apologizes.”50 As agreed by the two parties, the matter 
was declared closed, and no further comment was made by 
either. Six months later, BACM announced that it had sold its 
8 per cent interest in Carma “to allay public concern no matter 
how ill-conceived.”51
Since the federal government had decided to conduct a 
preliminary investigation, final resolution had to wait another 
year. Following detailed interviews with several civic ad-
ministrators, the Investigation and Research Branch of the 
Department of Consumer Affairs concluded that further inquiry 
under the Combines Investigation Act was not warranted. In 
a press release on 15 June 1976, Director Robert Bertrand 
announced that no violations had occurred or were about to 
occur. According to George Orr, director of the federal Bureau 
of Competition Policy, Genstar was not the only big operator in 
construction and land development in Calgary, and “being in a 
monopoly position was not in itself an offence under section 33 
of the Combines and Investigation Act relating to mergers and 
monopolies.” Rod Sykes was more caustic, noting that the deci-
sion not to hold an inquiry “indicates that a good deal of time 
and public money has been wasted on a political witch hunt.”52 
Project Apollo was finally put to rest.
Discussion
Several observations follow from this discussion. In terms of 
local government, the report demonstrated abuse of power by 
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The Genstar Report itself raises some questions. First, if all 
sources were in the public domain as stated, why were the 
authors so nervous? Certainly BACM et al. did not seem to be 
unduly concerned when the report was released. It was only 
when the matter was raised in the House of Commons and 
associated with the name Genstar that the parent corporation 
went on the offensive. Were “inside” sources consulted? Was 
this what Sykes was referring to in his original letter to Bertrand? 
In June 1976 in a private correspondence to Bertrand, Sykes felt 
that the report was “politically inspired.” One can also speculate 
about the report’s secrecy in that it appears that others knew 
about its existence and content.60 In summary, there remain 
many unanswered questions about the report itself in terms 
of who gave input and why, who else knew about it, and how 
significant it really was.
One could also associate the public mistrust of the land 
developers to the Genstar Report. From the time Calgary’s 
suburbanization had begun under private development in the 
mid 1950s, there had been very little public rancour directed 
at developers. Usually it manifested itself in sporadic disquiet 
over construction details and failure to maintain satisfactory 
timelines for road completions and utility connections or the 
removal of excavated material. Sometimes adequate park 
facilities were a source of community protest. The matter of 
developers’ profits was not called into question until the rising 
house prices of the late 1960s and 1970s. In this context the 
Genstar Report simply vindicated a mounting public suspicion 
that never went away.
One wonders what might have happened had the City allowed 
the lawsuit to continue. Certainly, there were elements on City 
Council who welcomed it.61 Most of Genstar’s documented 
inaccuracies in the report were qualitative or minor. Indeed, 
many of them were subsequently countered by the investigators. 
As already indicated, the report relied heavily on information 
available in the public realm. And most significantly, the authors 
made it quite clear that their findings were inconclusive and 
warranted further investigation. On the other hand, legal experts 
both within and outside City Hall believed that the inference of 
collusive monopoly put the City in a dangerous legal position. 
Peter Spurr of the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation 
noted that inaccuracies in the report would likely make the City 
very vulnerable to a lawsuit.62 Yet, given Genstar’s heavy involve-
ment in a fast growing city, the arrival of other developers like 
Melton Real Estate and Daon Developments, and most impor-
tant, the City’s options respecting the rate, timing and extent of 
development approvals, the City might have been successful in 
calling Genstar’s bluff.
It was the volatility of the Genstar Report that sealed its fate. 
The Genstar inquiry was a time bomb no one wanted to defuse 
and when it exploded, it was not on Genstar but in City Hall. 
Since it highlighted some disturbing trends in the land devel-
opment and construction industries in late-twentieth-century 
Canada, it probably deserved a better fate. Some would sug-
gest that this is precisely what decreed that fate. More likely, 
Project Apollo simply pointed out the obvious but lost its validity 
by inferring too much. Still, one might be excused for wondering.
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